Prince Adekoya II v. Michael Chertoff by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-21-2011 
Prince Adekoya II v. Michael Chertoff 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Prince Adekoya II v. Michael Chertoff" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1061. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1061 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
ALD-204        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1990 
 ___________ 
 
 PRINCE A.Z.K. ADEKOYA, II, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
MICHAEL CHERTOFF, Secretary of Homeland Security; U.S.  
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al, CHRISTOPHER SHANAHAN,  
Field Office Director, DHS/ICE New York, New York;  
R LOPEZ, Deportation Officer, Detention and Removal Operation  
DHS/ICE New York, New York; LEO MCGUIRE, Sheriff,  
Bergen County Jail, Hackensack N.J.; JOHN DOE, Undersheriff   
U.S. Bergen County Jail, Hackensack, NJ; JOHN DOE,  
Medical Director, Bergen County Jail, Hackensack, NJ; 
JACKSON, Captain, Bergen County Jail, Hackensack, New Jersey; 
BAKAY, Lieutenant, Bergen County Jail, Hackensack, New Jersey; 
PICKEL, Lieutenant, Bergen County Jail, Hackensack, New Jersey;  
M. MARTINELLI, Badge #1340, Sergeant, Bergen County Jail,  
Hackensack, New Jersey; K. GROOME, Badge # Unknown,  
Unit Officer, Bergen County Jail, Hackensack, New Jersey; 
J. CONDE, Badge # Unknown, Unit Officer, Bergen County Jail,  
Hackensack, New Jersey; PATRICK HUGHES, Badge # Unknown,  
Unit Officer, Bergen County Jail, Hackensack, New Jersey; 
B. YIGITKURT, Badge #1466, Unit Officer, Bergen County Jail,  
Hackensack, New Jersey; R. WHITE, Badge #1535, Unit Officer,  
Bergen County Jail, Hackensack, New Jersey; ACCOMANDO,  
Badge # 1447, Unit Officer, Bergen County Jail, Hackensack, New Jersey;  
D. PATTI, Badge #1416, Unit Officer, Bergen County Jail,  
Hackensack, New Jersey; R. TOURRE, Badge #1351, Unit Officer,  
Bergen County  Jail, Hackensack, New Jersey; P. MOSCATELLI,  
Badge # 1074, Corporal, Medication Round Officer,  
Bergen County Jail, Hackensack, New Jersey; KLEIN, Klein,  
RN- Medical Staff- Medical  Department, Bergen County Jail,  
Hackensack, New Jersey; G. FASCE, IEA, DHS/ICE Officer,  
Bergen County Jail, Hackensack, New Jersey; JANET NAPOLITANO,  
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Secretary of Homeland Security; Immigration & Customs Enforcement, et al 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2-08-cv-03994) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Katharine S. Hayden 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 9, 2011 
 Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed June 21, 2011 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Adekoya, proceeding pro se, is an immigration detainee housed at the Buffalo 
Federal Detention Facility in Batavia, New York.  He appeals from the District Court‟s 
order dismissing two of his claims and granting the defendant-appellees‟ motion for 
summary judgment on the remaining claim.  Because the appeal does not present a 
substantial question, we will summarily affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 
10.6. 
I 
 In August 2008, Adekoya filed in the District Court a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971), alleging that several state and federal officials violated his constitutional rights 
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during the three-week period he was housed at the Bergen County Jail (“BCJ”) in 
Hackensack, New Jersey.  Adekoya first alleged that BCJ staff violated his rights because 
they refused to provide him with halal meals.  Relatedly, he claimed that he refused to eat 
the meals he was provided and, as a result, BCJ medical staff did not give him pain 
medication that he was prescribed after having hand surgery.  Adekoya alleged that the 
failure to provide him pain medication inhibited his rehabilitation and has caused 
permanent injury to his hand.  Finally, he alleged that he was given insufficient access to 
the BCJ law library. 
 The District Court initially dismissed Adekoya‟s complaint, but granted him leave 
to amend the complaint.  After Adekoya filed an amended complaint, the District Court 
dismissed his halal meal and law library claims, but permitted his medical care claim to 
proceed.  The defendants against whom the claim was raised -- Nurse Ann Marie Klein 
and BCJ Officer Patricia Moscatelli -- sought summary judgment, which the District 
Court granted.  Adekoya filed a timely notice of appeal.   
II 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the sua sponte 
dismissal of a complaint is plenary.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 
2000).  To survive dismissal, Adekoya had to allege “sufficient factual matter, accepted 
as true, to „state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. 
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  
Dismissal was only appropriate if, “accepting all factual allegations as true and 
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construing the complaint in the light most favorable to [Adekoya], we determine that [he] 
is not entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.”  McGovern v. 
City of Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).  “Our review of a district court's grant of 
summary judgment is plenary, and we must apply the same standard the district court was 
required to apply under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56[].”  Spence v. ESAB Group, 
Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  “Thus, we can affirm only 'if the pleadings, the 
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.'”  Id. (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)).  “A genuine issue of 
material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury 
to return a verdict for that party.”  Id.  “In evaluating the evidence, we must view the 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that 
party's favor.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
 Because Adekoya was an immigration detainee at the time of the alleged 
constitutional violations, he was entitled to the same protections as a pretrial detainee.  
See Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 2000).  “[W]hen pretrial detainees 
challenge their conditions of confinement, we must consider whether there has been a 
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Hubbard v. Taylor, 
538 F.3d 229, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).  The Supreme Court has instructed that “the proper 
inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.”  Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).  To determine whether challenged conditions of 
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confinement amount to punishment, the “Bell Court mandated a pragmatic approach . . . 
and formulated the „reasonable relationship‟ test . . . .”  Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 
62, 67 (3d Cir. 2007).  Under that test, “if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial 
detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, 
without more, amount to „punishment.‟”  Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. 
 Adekoya first alleged that he is an adherent of Spiritism, which requires him to eat 
halal meals, and that the BCJ failed to provide him with appropriate food.  A prison‟s 
failure to provide meals that comply with inmates‟ religious dietary restrictions can give 
rise to constitutional claims.  See Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 215-16 (3d Cir. 
2003).  In Williams, Muslim inmates alleged that the prison‟s failure to provide them 
with halal meals containing meat violated their First Amendment rights, and that the 
prison‟s policy of providing kosher meals to Jewish inmates violated their rights to Equal 
Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id.  With regard to the First 
Amendment claim, we held that the prison was not required to provide meals containing 
halal meat, given that the prison provided vegetarian meals that complied with halal 
rules, the practice was reasonably related to the prison‟s legitimate interests in simplified 
food service, security, and operating within budget constraints, and the prison provided 
Muslim inmates with significant alternative means of practicing their religion.  See id. at 
217-19.  As to the inmates‟ Equal Protection claim, we concluded that no violation 
occurred because the evidence in the record showed that the kosher meals provided to 
Jewish inmates were also vegetarian.  See id. at 221-22. 
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 Turning to Adekoya‟s amended complaint, we agree with the District Court that 
he failed to make out a First Amendment claim.  Although he repeatedly alleged that he 
did not receive halal meals while at the BCJ, he did not allege that he was denied 
vegetarian meals or otherwise prevented from practicing his religion.  Without more, we 
agree with the District Court that Adekoya‟s allegation was insufficient to pass muster 
under Iqbal.  Likewise, we agree that Adekoya failed to allege an Equal Protection Clause 
violation.  Although he explained that Jewish inmates at BCJ received kosher meals, he 
did not allege that these kosher meals contained meat or that they were appreciably 
different from the meals he was provided. 
 Next, Adekoya alleged that he was denied access to the BCJ law library, despite 
having multiple cases pending in federal court.  Although prisoners have a constitutional 
right to access the courts, which includes a right to adequate law libraries and/or legal 
assistance for the purpose of challenging their convictions, sentences, or conditions of 
confinement, see Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 
817, 828 (1977), a prisoner alleging that he was deprived of his right to access the courts 
must allege that he suffered some injury as a result of the deprivation.  See Oliver v. 
Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351).  As the 
District Court noted, Adekoya did not specify the nature of any of his pending suits, and, 
more fundamentally, failed to allege that he suffered any prejudice because he could not 
access a law library during the approximately three weeks he was at the BCJ.  
Accordingly, we agree that he failed to adequately set forth a claim for relief. 
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 Finally, Adekoya alleged that Klein and Moscatelli were aware of his medical 
condition, but failed to provide him adequate medication or physical therapy.  He claimed 
that Nurse Klein knew he had to take his medication with food, but failed to provide him 
with halal food, thus forcing him to forego medication.  He also claimed that Moscatelli, 
who served as the medication rounds officer, failed to honor her promise to see about 
getting Adekoya halal meals.   
 In support of their summary judgment motion, the defendants presented evidence 
that Klein was responsible for administering Adekoya‟s medication on two occasions, 
and that she did so, and that Adekoya was advised by BCJ nurses not to take the 
medication on an empty stomach.  The defendants also presented evidence that, on a 
separate occasion, Klein had Adekoya brought to the infirmary because his hand was 
swollen and caused him significant pain, but he had not been given medication by 
another nurse because he would not eat.  Adekoya told her that he would not eat until he 
was given a halal meal and access to the law library.  Klein explained that she did not 
have authority to deal with either of those problems, but offered him a donut so that he 
would have something to eat with his medication.  Adekoya accepted her offer and took 
his pain medication.  Finally, Moscatelli averred that her only function while acting as the 
medication rounds officer was to accompany the nurse and secure the medication cart; 
she had no authority to dispense or withhold medication.  Although Adekoya took issue 
with some of the details in the defendants‟ statement of material facts, he did not dispute 
that Nurse Klein provided him with medication at appropriate times and that he took the 
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medicine, at least occasionally.  Rather, he suggested that Klein and Moscatelli indicated 
that they had the authority to help him with his other problems -- particularly his dietary 
concerns -- but did not do so.  However, nothing in the record supports his contention.  
Rather, our review of the record leads to the same conclusion reached by the District 
Court:  the defendant-appellees provided adequate medical treatment to Adekoya, and his 
failure to benefit from that treatment stemmed from his refusal to eat food he was 
dissatisfied with -- a problem for which neither Klein nor Moscatelli bore responsibility.  
Thus, the District Court correctly reasoned that Adekoya‟s medical care did not constitute 
punishment that violated Due Process, and summary judgment on that claim was 
appropriate. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm. 
 
 
